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Abstract: In this note we reconsider the indeﬁnite open-loop Nash linear quadratic diﬀerential game
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1 Introduction
In the last decades, there is an increased interest in studying diverse problems in economics and
optimal control theory using dynamic games. In particular in environmental economics and macro-
economic policy coordination, dynamic games are a natural framework to model policy coordination
problems (see e.g. the books and references in Dockner et al. [5] and Engwerda [9]). In these prob-
lems, the open-loop Nash strategy is often used as one of the benchmarks to evaluate outcomes of
the game. In optimal control theory it is well-known that, e.g., the issue to obtain robust control
strategies can be approached as a dynamic game problem (see e.g. [2]).
In this note we consider the open-loop linear quadratic diﬀerential game. This problem has been
considered by many authors and dates back to the seminal work of Starr and Ho in [17] (see, e.g.,
[14], [15], [6], [11], [10], [1], [18], [7], [8], [3] and [12]). More speciﬁcally, we study in this paper
the (regular indeﬁnite) inﬁnite-planning horizon case. The corresponding regular deﬁnite (that is
the case that the state weighting matrices Qi (see below) are semi-positive deﬁnite) problem has
been studied, e.g., extensively in [7] and [8]. Whereas [12] studied the regular indeﬁnite case using
a functional analysis approach, under the assumption that the uncontrolled system is stable. In
particular, these papers show that, in general, the inﬁnite-planning horizon problem does not have
a unique equilibrium. Moreover [12] shows that whenever the game has more than one equilibrium,
there will exist an inﬁnite number of equilibria. Furthermore the existence of a unique solution is
related to the existence of a so-called strongly stabilizing solution of the set of coupled algebraic
Riccati equations (6,7), below.
1In this paper we will generalize these results for stabilizable systems using a state-space approach.
The outline of this note is as follows. Section two introduces the problem and contains some pre-
liminary results. The main results of this paper are stated in Section three, whereas Section four
contains some concluding remarks. The proofs of the main theorems are included in the Appendix.
2 Preliminaries








subject to the linear dynamic state equation
˙ x(t)=Ax(t)+B1u1(t)+B2u2(t),x (0) = x0, (2)
Here, the matrices Qi and Ri are symmetric and Ri are, moreover, assumed to be positive deﬁnite,
i =1 ,2. Notice that we do not make any deﬁniteness assumptions w.r.t. matrix Qi.
We assume that the matrix pairs (A,Bi),i =1 ,2, are stabilizable. So, in principle, each player
is capable to stabilize the system on his own.
The open-loop information structure of the game means that we assume that both players only
know the initial state of the system and that the set of admissible control actions are functions of
time, where time runs from zero to inﬁnity. We assume that the players choose control functions
belonging to the set
Us =
 





where L2,loc is the set of locally square-integrable functions, i.e.,





Another set of functions we consider is the class of locally square integrable functions which expo-
nentially converge to zero when t →∞ , Le
2,loc. That is, for every c(.) ∈ Le
2,loc there exist strictly
positive constants M and α such that
|c(t)|≤Me
−αt.
We start our analysis with a result on the regular linear quadratic optimal control problem. Since
we were unable to trace this theorem in the literature, an outline of the proof is included.
Theorem 2.1 Let c(.) ∈ Le
2,loc, (A,B) stabilizable, Q symmetric and R>0. Consider the mini-





subject to the state dynamics
˙ x(t)=Ax(t)+Bu(t)+c(t),x (0) = x0, (4)
2and u ∈ Us. Then, the linear quadratic problem (3,4)has a solution for all x0 ∈ I Rn if and only if
the algebraic Riccati equation
Q + A
TK + KA− KBR
−1B
TK =0 ( 5 )
has a symmetric stabilizing solution K(.), i.e K is such that A − BR−1BTK is stable.











and x∗(t) is the through this optimal control implied solution of the diﬀerential equation
˙ x
∗(t)=( A − SK)x
∗(t) − Sm(t)+c(t),x
∗(0) = x0.
Proof. (Outline) First consider the case c(.) = 0. Under the assumption that (A,B) is controllable
it follows from e.g. [4] (see also [19]) that the theorem holds. In case (A,B) is stabilizable, one
implication follows from a standard completion of squares argument. The reverse implication is
























with (A11,B 1) controllable and A22 stable.
Since the optimization problem has a solution for every initial state, it follows that it has in par-
ticular a solution for x0 =[ xT
10, 0]T. From the above quoted result it follows then that the alge-
braic Riccati equation AT
11K1 + K1A11 + Q11 − K1B1R−1BT
1 K1 = 0 has a stabilizing solution (here
Q11 =[ I 0]Q[I 0]T). From this it is readily veriﬁed, by elementary spelling out (5), that (5) has a
stabilizing solution too.
Finally, the fact that the above equivalence continues to hold even when c(.) diﬀers from zero, fol-
lows from the general argument that linear terms do not play a role to decide whether a quadratic
functional has a minimum or not (see e.g. [13, Section 1.4.2]). 
Let Si := BiR
−1
i Bi. Tightly connected with ﬁnding the open-loop Nash equilibria of the game
(1,2) is the set of coupled algebraic Riccati equations (ARE) given by
0=Q1 + A
TP1 + P1A − P1S1P1 − P1S2P2, (6)
0=Q2 + A
TP2 + P2A − P2S2P2 − P2S1P1;( 7 )
and the two algebraic Riccati equations,
Qi + A
TKi + KiA − KiSiKi =0 ,i =1 ,2. (8)
Similar to, e.g., [7], it can be shown that every solution to the set of equations (6,7) can be









and vice versa. To be more precise
Theorem 2.2 Let V ⊂ I R3n be an n-dimensional invariant subspace of M,a n dl e tXi ∈ I Rn×n,i =












If X0 is invertible, then Pi := XiX
−1
0 ,i =1 ,2, is a solution to the set of coupled Riccati equations
(6,7)and σ(A − S1P1 − S2P2)=σ(M|V) 1. Furthermore, the solution (P1,P 2) is independent of the
speciﬁc choice of basis of V . 
Theorem 2.3 Let Pi ∈ I Rn×n,i =1 ,2, be a solution to the set of coupled Riccati equations (1,2).
Then there exist matrices Xi ∈ I Rn×n,i=0 ,1,2,w i t hX0 invertible, such that Pi = XiX
−1
0 .






 T form a basis of an n-dimensional invariant subspace
of M. 
The set of (strongly) stabilizing solutions of (6,7) play an important role in the subsequent analysis.
Deﬁnition a, below, introduces the concept of a stabilizing solution. This notion generalizes the
one-player case deﬁnition. Deﬁnition b, item ii., states that a strongly stabilizing solution has the
additional property that the spectrum of the controlled dual system should be in the closed left-half
of the complex plane.
Deﬁnition 2.4 As o l u t i o n( P1,P 2) of the set of algebraic Riccati equations (6,7) is called
a. stabilizing,i fσ(A − S1P1 − S2P2) ⊂ l C−;
b. strongly stabilizing if




−AT + P1S1 P1S2





From the above Theorems 2.2, 2.3 it follows immediately that
1σ(H) denotes the spectrum of matrix H; l C− = {λ ∈ l C | Re(λ) < 0}; l C
+
0 = {λ ∈ l C | Re(λ) > 0}.
4Corollary 2.5 (6,7)has a set of stabilizing solutions (P1,P 2) if and only if M has an n-dimensional
stable-invariant graph subspace. 
Furthermore, the next two important properties of a strongly stabilizing solution are easily obtained.
Theorem 2.6
1. The set of algebraic Riccati equations (6,7)has a strongly stabilizing solution (P1,P 2) if and only
if matrix M has an n-dimensional stable graph subspace and M has 2n eigenvalues (counting
algebraic multiplicities)in l C
+
0 .
2. If the set of algebraic Riccati equations (6,7)has a strongly stabilizing solution, then it is unique.
Proof.












A − S1P1 − S2P2 S1 S2
0 P1S1 − AT P1S2
0 P2S1 P2S2 − AT

.
Since (P1,P 2) is a strongly stabilizing solution, by Deﬁnition 2.4, matrix M has exact n stable
eigenvalues and 2n eigenvalues (counted with algebraic multiplicities) in l C
+
0 . Furthermore, obviously,
the stable subspace is a graph subspace.
The converse statement is obtained similarly using the result of Theorem 2.2.
2. Using the result from item 1, Corollary 2.5 shows that there exists exactly one stabilizing solution.
So, our solution (P1,P 2) must be unique. 
Next we state two technical lemmas that are used in the proofs of our main theorems. A proof
of them can be found, e.g., in [9]. Lemma 2.7 deals with the stable subspace, Es, of a linear system.






































1. dim Es ≥ p,a n d






Lemma 2.8 Assume there exists an initial state x0  =0such that
x(t)=e
−ATtx0 → 0i ft →∞and B
Tx(t)=0 .
Then (A,B) is not stabilizable. 
53 Main results
Using the previous results, in the Appendix the following theorem is proved.
Theorem 3.1 If the linear quadratic diﬀerential game (1,2)has an open-loop Nash equilibrium for
every initial state, then
1. M has at least n stable eigenvalues (counted with algebraic multiplicities). More in particular,









for some Vi ∈ I Rn×n.
2. the two algebraic Riccati equations (8)have a symmetric stabilizing solution Ki(.), i =1 ,2.
Conversely, if vT(t)= :[ xT(t),ψT
1 (t),ψT
2 (t)] is an asymptotically stable solution of ˙ v(t)=Mv(t),x (0) =







i ψi(t),i =1 ,2,
provides an open-loop Nash equilibrium for the linear quadratic diﬀerential game (1,2). 
Remark 3.2 From this theorem one can draw a number of conlusions concerning the existence
of open-loop Nash equilibria. A general conclusion is that this number depends critically on the
eigenstructure of matrix M. We will distinguish some cases. To that end, let s denote the number
(counting algebraic multiplicities) of stable eigenvalues of M.
1. If s<n , still for some initial state there may exist an open-loop Nash equilibrium. Consider, e.g.,
the case that s = 1. Then, for every x0 ∈ Span [I, 0, 0]v,w h e r ev is an eigenvector corresponding
with the stable eigenvalue, the game has a Nash equilibrium.
2. In case s ≥ 2, the situation might arise that for some initial states there exists an inﬁnite
number of equilibria. A situation in which there are an inﬁnite number of Nash equilibrium actions
occurs if, e.g., v1 and v2 are two independent eigenvectors in the stable subspace of M for which
[I, 0, 0]v1 = µ[I, 0, 0]v2, for some scalar µ. In such a situation,
x0 = λ[I, 0, 0]v1 +( 1− λ)µ[I, 0, 0]v2,
for an arbitrary scalar λ ∈ I R. The resulting equilibrium control actions, however, diﬀer for each λ
(apart from some exceptional cases). 
Similar to [3, Theorem 6.22] it can be shown that
Theorem 3.3 Assume that
61. the set of coupled algebraic Riccati equations (6,7)has a stabilizing solution; and
2. the two algebraic Riccati equations (8)have a symmetric stabilizing solution Ki(.), i =1 ,2.
Then the linear quadratic diﬀerential game (1,2)has an open-loop Nash equilibrium for every initial







i PiΦ(t,0)x0,i =1 ,2. (10)
Here Φ(t,0) satisﬁes the transition equation ˙ Φ(t,0) = (A − S1P1 − S2P2)Φ(t,0); Φ(t,t)=I. 
The above reﬂections raise the question whether it is possible to ﬁnd conditions under which the
game has a unique equilibrium for every initial state. The next Theorem 3.4 gives such conditions.
Moreover, it shows that in that case the unique equilibrium actions can be synthesized as a state
feedback. The proof of this theorem is provided in the Appendix.
Theorem 3.4 The linear quadratic diﬀerential game (1,2)has a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium
for every initial state if and only if
1. The set of coupled algebraic Riccati equations (6,7)has a strongly stabilizing solution, and
2. the two algebraic Riccati equations (8)have a stabilizing solution.
Moreover, the unique equilibrium actions are given by (10). 
Example 3.5
1. Consider the system















The eigenvalues of M are {−3,2,3}. An eigenvector corresponding with the eigenvalue −3i s
[5, 1,, 4]T.
So, according Theorem 2.6 item 1, the with this game corresponding set of algebraic Riccati equa-
tions (6,7) has a strongly stabilizing solution. Furthermore, since qi > 0,i =1 ,2, the two algebraic
Riccati equations (8) have a stabilizing solution. Consequently, this game has a unique open-loop
Nash equilibrium for every initial state x0.
2. Reconsider the game in item 1, but with the system dynamics replaced by
˙ x(t)=2 x(t)+u1(t)+u2(t),x (0) = x0.
Then M has the eigenvalues {−3,−2,3}.S i n c eM has two stable eigenvalues, it follows from Theorem
2.6 item 1 that the with this game corresponding set of algebraic Riccati equations (6,7) does not
7have a strongly stabilizing solution. So, see Theorem 3.4, the game does not have for every initial
state a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium.
On the other hand, since [1, 1, 4]T is an eigenvector corresponding with λ = −3, it follows from the
Corollaries 2.5 and Theorem 3.3 that the game does have an open-loop Nash equilibrium for every
initial state that permits a feedback synthesis.
In fact for every initial state there are an inﬁnite number of equilibria. For every α ∈ I R the
equilibrium actions u∗
1(t)=−2(e−5tx0 −αe−3t), u∗
2(t)=−2(e−5tx0 +αe−3t) yield an open-loop Nash
equilibrium. 
4 Concluding Remarks
In this note we considered the regular indeﬁnite inﬁnite-planning horizon linear-quadratic diﬀerential
game. Both necessary conditions and suﬃcient conditions were derived for the existence of an open-
loop Nash equilibrium. Moreover, conditions were presented that are both necessary and suﬃcient
for the existence of a unique equilibrium.
The above results can be generalized straightforwardly to the N-player case. Furthermore, since Qi
are assumed to be indeﬁnite, the obtained results can be directly used to (re)derive properties for the
zero-sum game, which plays, e.g., an important role in robustness analysis. If players discount their
future loss, similar to [7], it follows from Theorem 3.4 that if the discount factor is ”large enough”
the game has generically a unique open-loop Nash equilibrium. Finally we conclude from (17) that
the conclusion in [12], that if the game has an open-loop Nash equilibrium for every initial state
either there is a unique equilibrium or an inﬁnite number of equilibria, applies in general.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 3.1.
”⇒ part” Suppose that u∗
1,u ∗














From the ﬁrst inequality we see that for every x0 ∈ I Rn the (nonhomogeneous) linear quadratic








subject to the (nonhomogeneous) state equation
˙ x(t)=Ax(t)+B1u1(t)+B2u
∗
2(t),x (0) = x0,
has a solution. This implies, see Theorem 2.1, that the algebraic Riccati equation (8) has a stabilizing
solution (with i = 1). In a similar way it follows that also the second algebraic Riccati equation must
have a stabilizing solution. Which completes the proof of point 2.















˙ x1 = Ax1 + B1u1 + B2u
∗
2,x 1(0) = x0,












and K1 the stabilizing solution of the algebraic Riccati equation
Q1 + A
TX + XA− XS1X =0 . (12)
Notice that, since the optimal control ˜ u1 is uniquely determined, and by deﬁnition the equilibrium
control u∗








2(t) − ((A − S1K1)x1(t) − S1m1(t)+B2u
∗
2(t))
= Ax(t) − S1(K1x1(t)+m1(t)) − Ax1(t)+S1K1x1(t)+S1m1(t)
= A(x(t) − x1(t)).
Since x(0) − x1(0) = x0 − x0 = 0 it follows that x1(t)=x(t).
In a similar way we obtain from the minimization of J2,w i t hu∗















and K2 the stabilizing solution of the algebraic Riccati equation
Q2 + A
TX + XA− XS2X =0 .
By straightforward diﬀerentiation of mi(t) in (11) and (13), respectively, we obtain








Next, introduce ψi(t):= Kix(t)+mi(t),i =1 ,2. Using (14) and (12) we get
˙ ψ1(t)=K1 ˙ x(t)+ ˙ m1(t)




2(t) − (A − S1K1)
Tm1(t)
=( −Q1 − A
TK1)x(t) − K1S1m1(t) − (A − S1K1)
Tm1(t)
= −Q1x(t) − A
T(K1x(t)+m1(t))
= −Q1x(t) − A
Tψ1(t). (15)




˙ v(t)=Mv(t), with v1(0) = x0.
9Since by assumption, for arbitrary x0, v1(t) converges to zero it is clear from Lemma 2.7 by choosing
consecutively x0 = ei,i=1 ,···,n,that matrix M must have at least n stable eigenvalues (counting
algebraic multiplicities). Moreover, the other statement follows from the second part of this lemma.
Which completes this part of the proof.
”⇐ part” Let u∗








We next show that then necessarily u∗










˙ ˜ x(t)=A˜ x(t)+B1u1(t)+B2u
∗(t), ˜ x(0) = x0.
Since, by assumption, the algebraic Riccati equation
Q1 + A
TK1 + K1A − K1S1K1 =0 ( 1 6 )
has a stabilizing solution, according Theorem 2.1, the above minimization problem has a solution.














˜ ψ1(t):= K1˜ x(t)+m1(t).
Then, similar to (15) we obtain
˙ ˜ ψ1 = −Q1˜ x − A
T ˜ ψ1.






























is the Hamiltonian matrix associated with the algebraic Riccati
equation (16). Recall that the spectrum of this matrix is symmetric w.r.t. the imaginary axis. Since
by assumption the Riccati equation (16) has a stabilizing solution, we know that its stable invariant













10for some vectors vi,i=1 ,2. However, it is easily veriﬁed that due to our asymptotic stability
assumption both xd(t)a n dψd(t) converge to zero if t →∞ .S o ,v2 must be zero. From this it follows
now directly that p = 0. Since the solution of the diﬀerential equation is uniquely determined, and
[xd(t) ψd(t)] = [0 0] solve it, we conclude that ˜ x(t)=x(t)a n d ˜ ψ1(t)=ψ1(t). Or stated diﬀerently,
u∗
1 solves the minimization problem.
In a similar way it is shown that for u1 given by u∗
1, player two his optimal control is given by u∗
2.
Which proves the claim. .
Proof of Theorem 3.4.
”⇒ part” That the Riccati equations (8) must have a stabilizing solution follows directly from
Theorem 3.1.
Assume that matrix M has a s-dimensional stable graph subspace S,w i t hs>n .L e t{b1,···,b s} be
a basis for S.D e n o t edi :=[ I,0,0]bi and assume (without loss of generality) that Span [d1,···,d n]=
I Rn.T h e ndn+1 = µ1d1+···+µndn for some µi,i=1 ,···,n. Furthermore, let x0 = α1d1+···+αndn.
Then also for arbitrary λ ∈ [0,1],
x0 = λ(α1d1 + ···+ αndn)+( 1− λ)(dn+1 − µ1d1 −···−µndn)
=[ I,0,0]{λ(α1b1 + ···+ αnbn)+( 1− λ)(bn+1 − µ1b1 −···−µnbn)}
=[ I,0,0]{(λα1 − (1 − λ)µ1)b1 + ···+( λαn − (1 − λ)µn)bn +( 1− λ)bn+1}.
Next consider
vλ :=( λα1 − (1 − λ)µ1)b1 + ···+( λαn − (1 − λ)µn)bn +( 1− λ)bn+1.
Notice that vλ1  = vλ2 whenever λ1  = λ2.
According Theorem 3.1 all solutions vT(t)=[ xT,ψ T
1 ,ψ T
2 ]o f˙ v(t)=Mv(t),v (0) = vλ, induce then





i ψi,λ(t),i =1 ,2. (17)
Since by assumption for every initial state there is a unique equilibrium strategy it follows on the
one hand that the by these equilibrium strategies induced state trajectory xλ(t) coincides for all λ





i ψi,λ2(t), ∀λ1,λ 2 ∈ [0,1]. (18)
Since ˙ ψi,λ = −Qixλ(t) − ATψi,λ it follows that
˙ ψi,λ1 − ˙ ψi,λ2 = −A
T(ψi,λ1 − ψi,λ2)a n dB
T
i (ψi,λ1(t) − ψi,λ2(t)) = 0. (19)
Notice that both ψi,λ1(t)a n dψi,λ2(t) converge to zero. Furthermore, since vλ1  = vλ2 whenever
λ1  = λ2, {b1,···,b n+1} are linearly independent and Span[d1,···,d n]=I Rn, it can be easily veriﬁed
that at least for one i, ψi,λ1(0)  = ψi,λ2(0), for some λ1 and λ2. Therefore, by Lemma 2.8, it follows
from (19) that (A,Bi) is not stabilizable. But this violates our basic assumption. So, our assumption
that s>nmust have been wrong and we conclude that matrix M has an n-dimensional stable graph
subspace and that the dimension of the subspace corresponding with non-stable eigenvalues is 2n.
By Theorem 2.6 the set of Riccati equations (6,7) has then a strongly stabilizing solution.
”⇐ part” Since by assumption the stable subspace, Es, is a graph subspace we know that every
11initial state, x0, can be written uniquely as a combination of the ﬁrst n entries of the basisvectors
in Es. Consequently, with every x0 there corresponds a unique ψ1 and ψ2 for which the solution of




2 ], converges to zero. So, according
Theorem 3.1, for every x0 there is a Nash equilibrium. On the other hand we have from the proof of









i ψi(t),i =1 ,2,














, with x(0) = x0.
Now, consider the system












Since (A,Bi),i =1 ,2, is stabilizable, it is easily veriﬁed that the pair (C,M ) is detectable. Conse-
quently, due to our assumption that x(t)a n du∗
i(t),i=1 ,2, converge to zero, we have from Lemma
[20, Lemma 14.1] that [xT(t),ψ T
1 (t),ψ T
2 (t)] converges to zero. Therefore, [xT(0),ψ T
1 (0),ψ T
2 (0)] has
to belong to the stable subspace of M. However, as we argued above, for every x0 there is exactly
one vector ψ1(0) and vector ψ2(0) such that [xT(0),ψ T
1 (0),ψ T
2 (0)] ∈ Es. So we conclude that for
every x0 there exists exactly one Nash equilibrium.
Finally notice that by Theorem 3.3 the game has an equilibrium for every initial state given by
(10). Since for every initial state the equilibrium actions are uniquely determined, it follows that the
equilibrium actions u∗
i,i =1 ,2, have to coincide with (10). 
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